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Introduction: Exorcising America’s Demons, 
Building Ethical Democracy
Three demons bedevil American society today. The ﬁ rst is obvious: We 
suffer levels of economic inequality not witnessed in the hundred years 
since the Gilded Age, with stagnant or falling wages for the large majority 
of American families. The second is often misdiagnosed: Political pundits 
decry the polarization within national political discourse and institutions, 
but the real problem is not generic “polarization.” In the context of such 
high economic inequality, polarization is to be expected, for its absence 
would simply represent acquiescence to stagnant wages and the resultant 
decline in the quality of family life. Rather, the real problem results from 
strategic polarization from above, that is, from the manipulation of politi-
cal sentiment and democratic institutions to produce paralysis within na-
tional democratic institutions.1 Thus the second demon is policy paralysis: 
our national political institutions’ inability to foster any shared prosperity 
or good society in the American future— their failure, in the context of stra-
tegic polarization from above, to effectively address a broad variety of cru-
cial realities undermining a shared American future. Those issues include 
economic inequality and stagnant family wages, the underclass status of 
a large immigrant sector, the ballooning national debt, the corrosive in-
ﬂ uence of unregulated money on elections, and the unsustainable rise of 
health care costs despite recent policy reforms.
Closely bound up with the ﬁ rst two demons is the recrudescence of a 
third demon that has forever bedeviled American society:2 racial inequity, 
the ways that racial and ethnic minorities— the emerging majority of Amer-
ican society in the near future— disproportionately suffer the consequences 
of economic inequality and policy paralysis. Indeed, minorities in general 
and African Americans in particular too often stand at the whipping post 
some politicians and political commentators use to ﬂ og the issues that 
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2 / Introduction
drive policy paralysis.3 Only by casting out these three demons can the 
United States hope to build a shared future for all. Yet American society 
struggles to ﬁ nd adequate democratic means to even begin to do so.
This book plumbs for a way forward against these three demons by 
analyzing the experience of one broad movement that directly addresses 
economic inequality, policy paralysis, and racial injustice in the United 
States. Faith- based community organizing has a decades- long track record 
of working to advance the ideals of shared democratic life.4 The movement 
works in poor, working- class, and middle- class settings to advance the po-
litical voice and economic interests of those sectors; it has recently pro-
vided a high- proﬁ le voice in national debates regarding universal health 
care, immigration reform, the foreclosure crisis, racial proﬁ ling, and the 
effort to rein in Wall Street malfeasance.5 Projecting that voice has required 
faith- based organizing to broaden its historic focus on local communities 
or metropolitan areas in order to build links between local organizing and 
inﬂ uence on higher- level policy. Underlying this development has been a 
new, more ambitious set of political aspirations within some sectors of the 
ﬁ eld. As one prominent strategist in the ﬁ eld, George Goehl (executive di-
rector of National People’s Action [NPA]) noted:
I think we marginalize ourselves by thinking of [ourselves] as the “commu-
nity organizing sector.” I think that’s just really small. We want to change 
the political terrain of the country in a way that creates opportunity and ad-
vances racial and economic justice. What do we need to do, to do that? What 
kind of institutions do we need to build? What kind of talent do we need 
to attract and train? What kind of infrastructure do we need? What would 
it take to shift the ideas at the center of American life? And what role does 
organizing play in that?6
We seek answers to Goehl’s questions not in abstract theory, but by 
using ideas to illuminate the experience of faith- based organizing coali-
tions and networks as they address the three demons identiﬁ ed above. In 
particular, we probe the tension between two ideals of American democ-
racy: the universalist ideal, embodied in the notion that the democratic 
promise of equal opportunity applies to all Americans regardless of eco-
nomic class and social identity; and the multiculturalist ideal, embodied 
in efforts to actually redeem that promise vis- à- vis subaltern groups that 
have been historically excluded from it, with legacies that continue to-
day.7 As shown below, democratic theorists and legal scholars have long 
debated the notion of an inherent contradiction between universalist and 
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Introduction / 3
multiculturalist democratic ideals— that is, between understandings and 
practices of democracy that emphasize universal principles and absolute 
equality of citizens before the law, and those that emphasize redressing 
the unequal status of different groups within a multicultural society. Our 
focus here will fall less on the theoretical tension between these strands 
of democratic thinking and more on how that tension- in- principle ac-
tually plays out within organizations struggling to advance democratic 
outcomes.
Thus the insight we offer emerges from a binocular view: one eye on the 
interplay of universalist and multiculturalist democratic ideals; the other 
eye on faith- based organizing’s work to advance democratic voice and 
equality in multiracial settings, where the dynamic tension between the 
two ideals is played out.
We show that this tension, when handled effectively, can be politically 
fertile in the sense of producing new democratic energy for grassroots po-
litical efﬁ cacy. We show that faith- based community organizing offers an 
excellent setting for advancing this analytic agenda, because major sec-
tors of that movement are embedded in highly diverse communities and 
are committed to sustaining internal multicultural pluralism and do so in 
ways demonstrably effective in external political terms. All of the above 
have been true of faith- based community organizing at the local level for 
some time, but two new factors make this analysis particularly timely. First, 
in the last ten years the ﬁ eld has become markedly more ambitious (and 
signiﬁ cantly more effective) at projecting power onto higher- level political 
terrain and into more substantive political ﬁ ghts at the local level. The ﬁ eld 
thus has greater insight to offer an American society struggling to ﬁ nd ad-
equate democratic means to combat rising inequality. Second, in the past 
faith- based organizing had largely kept the linkage between multicultural 
pluralism and the struggle for racial equity implicit in its work, whereas to-
day large sectors of the ﬁ eld now make that linkage explicit.8 At a time when 
concerns are growing about deepening inequality between racial/ethnic 
groups in America, making this linkage explicit is critical for a society in 
which children of color already constitute a majority of those under eigh-
teen years of age, a society on a trajectory to become a majority- minority 
country in those children’s lifetimes.
This introduction brieﬂ y frames the theoretical and philosophical issues 
at stake in the tension between the democratic ideals of universalism and 
multiculturalism, introduces the social movement that offers a concrete 
setting for exploring and addressing that tension, and provides an overview 
of the book’s chapters and central argument.
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4 / Introduction
Democracy and Multiculturalism: Dilemmas 
of the Democratic Public Sphere
Moral and political universalism . . . are not irreconcilable with the recognition 
of, respect for, and democratic negotiation of certain forms of difference.
—Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture
Seyla Benhabib, a leading social theorist, captures the complexity of the 
struggle to preserve the promise of universalist democracy while simulta-
neously coming to terms with the multicultural reality of contemporary 
society. The “forms of difference” for which strong multiculturalists argue 
include those based on race, ethnicity, immigration status, gender, and sex-
ual preference, as well as those carried in communities based on religious 
afﬁ liation or nationality. In arguing for a certain kind of democratic univer-
salism, Benhabib takes seriously the legitimacy of particular claims ema-
nating from these communities, but she argues that those claims best con-
tribute to the long- term development of a democratic public sphere when 
they are embedded within broader, more universalistic understandings of 
democratic life, such as those derived from the work of Jürgen Habermas.9
Although not widely known to nonacademic American audiences, 
Habermas provides the framework for much contemporary thinking about 
the nature of democracy.10 Central to his theory and widely adopted among 
social theorists is the concept of a democratic public sphere: all those settings 
in which people deliberate together regarding publicly relevant concerns. 
Via the public sphere, the democratic will takes shape— that is, the building 
up of sufﬁ cient collective will to impel shared civil initiatives and govern-
mental action to solve problems faced by contemporary society. Also via 
the public sphere, subcultures that unnecessarily restrict personal rights, op-
portunities, and autonomy can be interrogated and encouraged to change, 
over time contributing to democratizing trends throughout a culture. Im-
portantly, however, it is also via the democratic public sphere that those 
subcultures can argue back in favor of the validity of their worldviews and 
commitments— and why society should change.11 Thus Habermas offers a 
society- centered view of democratic life instead of the highly government- 
centered and market- centered views more familiar to most audiences. In 
providing a focus on cultural and institutional dynamics in civil society, 
Habermas’s framework offers a way to think about long- term political and 
economic reform as partly a struggle to reshape the institutions and cultural 
assumptions that inform political and economic decision making.
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Introduction / 5
Benhabib and another feminist theorist, Nancy Fraser, were among the 
most cogent early interlocutors and critics of Habermas’s initial analysis of 
the democratic public sphere, which was centered on the abstract notion 
of an “idealized speech community.”12 Both were concerned with the way 
Habermas’s abstract conceptualization elided questions of power, espe-
cially the way powerful interests exclude or suppress marginal voices even 
within what is ostensibly a democratic space. But they developed their po-
sitions vis- à- vis Habermas in quite distinct ways. In counterpoint to Haber-
mas’s universalism, Fraser developed the concept of subaltern counterpublic 
spheres— alternative public spaces outside of the public arena that money 
and power dominate. Such spaces shelter subaltern groups from the stig-
matizing assumptions that constitute them as outside public discourse. In 
such subaltern spaces, the marginalized can formulate their own identi-
ties and recognize their own dignity— and ultimately insist on that dignity 
in the wider society. Thus, in the past, men without property, women in 
general, racialized minorities, and subnational ethnic groups all built sub-
altern counterpublic spheres from which to contest their marginal status. 
Today in American society, we witness the same dynamic among undocu-
mented immigrants and same- sex couples seeking a recognized, legitimate 
status.13 Fraser’s position, while not in principle hostile to universal demo-
cratic standards, in practice emphasizes insights in keeping with a more 
deeply multiculturalist version of democratic theory.14
In contrast, Benhabib’s position remains grounded in the universal-
ist democratic tradition derived from Habermas. Benhabib draws on that 
tradition to articulate a critique of what she calls the “four dogmas of 
multiculturalism.” She identiﬁ es these as (1) the dogmas of cultural ho-
lism, (2)  the overly socialized self, (3) the prison house of perspectives, 
and (4)  the distrust of the universal.15 We can summarize her concerns 
as follows: even when multiculturalists are motivated by a proper desire 
to advance the cause of justice for marginalized social groups, they pro-
mote understandings of society that ultimately undermine that very proj-
ect. They often promote a view of each subculture as an integrated whole, 
relatively static and sufﬁ cient unto itself, with its own standards of justice 
held without interrogation by other views. However, subcultures are dy-
namic; they are embedded in history and inevitably shaped by interac-
tion with other subcultures. In particular, each embodies its own forms 
of injustice and illegitimate power, which must be interrogated (in part 
from within, but also via critique from the standpoint of other subcul-
tures). According to Benhabib, multiculturalists give culture such power 
over people that individuals and groups appear locked into culturally de-
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6 / Introduction
termined views rather than being capable of contesting and combining 
cultural views as they go about constructing their own political agency in 
the world. Benhabib argues that in rightly rejecting the claim to rational 
impartiality and universalism made by some white, male, heterosexual, 
Western perspectives, multiculturalists implicitly throw out any standards 
of fairness by which social policy might be judged. Ironically, they do so 
in the name of a multiculturalist project seeking precisely such fairness 
for marginalized groups. As a result, from this standpoint even the best- 
intentioned multiculturalists face what Benhabib calls “the fundamental 
dilemmas of multiculturalism”16— that is, the tensions between universal 
egalitarian democratic standards and the implications of their own appeal 
to particularist cultural identities.
Ultimately, Benhabib embraces Fraser’s argument for recognition of 
marginalized identities and redistributive policies to beneﬁ t the least advan-
taged— but she does so while insisting that such policies be universalist:
I would indeed agree with defenders of strong group identities that to redress 
entrenched social inequalities redistributive programs need to be in place, 
and that the democratic dialogue about collective identity should not result 
in the neglect of the needs of the weak, the needy, the downtrodden, and the 
victim of discrimination. Here again a more universalistic perspective sug-
gests itself: In the allocation of distributive beneﬁ ts, why not ﬁ nd programs 
and procedures that foster group solidarity across color, culture, ethnic, and 
racial lines? Why not universalize the entitlement to certain beneﬁ ts to all 
groups in a society? . . . [she goes on to suggest high minimum wages, better 
access to health care and education] The public conversation would then be 
about redistribution as well as recognition. Yet the goal would be to redress 
socioeconomic inequalities among the population at large via measures and 
policies that reﬂ ect intergroup solidarity and cultural hybridity.17
By embracing and extending a core insight from Fraser’s work, Ben-
habib moves beyond a caricature that would equate all multiculturalist po-
sitions as “identity politics” conceived in narrowly ethnocentric terms. She 
explains that when multiculturalist claims are reconceived as a “politics of 
recognition,”18 they can be voiced and debated without simply “accepting 
that the only way to do so is by afﬁ rming a group’s right to (unilaterally) 
deﬁ ne the content as well as the boundaries of its own identity.” That is, 
multiculturalist claims can be asserted without dissolving the healthy inter-
change between cultures as well as the healthy contestation of inequality 
within them that produces democratic progress. Benhabib argues on theo-
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Introduction / 7
retical grounds that this will occur only when multiculturalist claims are 
embedded within an overarching universalist aspiration.
Iris Marion Young adopts an even stronger multiculturalist position, in-
sisting on the limitations of any universalist claim:19
I agree with many of the points that Benhabib makes about the wide range 
of issues she takes up in this essay. Like many others who in recent years 
have worried about the dangers of group- based political claims, however, 
Benhabib wrongly reduces the differences that motivate such claims to cul-
ture. In these remarks I want to reinstate a more generic interpretation of 
a politics of difference in which culturally based claims are only one spe-
cies. In this more generic understanding, the problems that motivate social 
movements around group difference have to do with dominant norms and 
expectations in the society. Dominant institutions support norms and expec-
tations that privilege some groups and render others deviant. Some of these 
are cultural norms, but others are norms of capability, social role, sexual de-
sire, or location in the division of labor. Most group- based political claims of 
justice are responses to these structures of privilege and disadvantage.20
Despite Young’s protestations, her focus on “norms of capability, social 
role, sexual desire” seems to evoke precisely the kinds of cultural norms 
that Benhabib discusses. But Young’s position does foster great clarity re-
garding the disadvantaged power position of subaltern groups in democratic 
dialogue. To the extent such dialogue occurs on cultural terrain deﬁ ned by 
dominant institutions, subaltern groups are often marginalized or stigma-
tized within whatever dialogue occurs. She thus continues, “Attention to 
the issues of justice [that] many group- based claims raise, however, goes 
beyond principles of tolerance and openness, to the criticism and trans-
formation of social structures that marginalize and normalize,” and, later, 
“What is at stake in a politics of difference is privilege more than ‘recogni-
tion.’”21 Thus Young’s framing more clearly marks out ground from which 
subaltern groups can question the terms of privilege across the boundaries 
of multicultural settings.
As fruitful as these ideas have been in exploring the dynamics of democ-
racy and the struggles of subaltern groups to deepen democratic life, they 
have also generated sharply contested understandings of democratic ideals. 
Those debates have been especially sharp around the question of multicul-
turalism and democracy. We can locate our democratic growing pains at 
the tension between two questions: First, how can highly valued “forms of 
difference” be sustained in the face of the disruptive and (at times) homo-
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8 / Introduction
genizing forces of modernity and globalization? Some communities at-
tempt to sustain their difference by striving to wall themselves off from cri-
tique or inﬂ uence from those who do not share and thus would reject their 
own commitments and construction of reality. Such “walling off” occurs 
in socially powerful groups because they strive to avoid engagement with 
those who might question their power; it occurs in marginalized groups as 
they seek shelter from the stigmatizing gaze of the powerful. In both cases, 
isolation can serve to avoid egalitarian and democratic pressures (for ex-
ample, pressure to discard assumptions of white privilege among the pow-
erful; or to discard sexist, anti- immigrant, or antigay assumptions in some 
marginalized groups). The second question therefore arises: How can full 
commitment to the egalitarian ideals of democracy be sustained if any self- 
identiﬁ ed “form of difference” can legitimately wall itself off from being 
questioned by the wider democratic dialogue? In the long term, how we 
answer these questions will determine whether democracy will be substan-
tively deepened via the hard dialogue of differing worldviews, or simply 
fragmented into competing worldviews incapable of engaging one another 
constructively.
This book explores these questions while asking what a shared future 
for all members of American society might look like— not just any “shared 
future” but rather one that could be termed ethical democracy. Ethical de-
mocracy entails not simply the presence of a particular set of electoral in-
stitutions or political arrangements, nor does it assume that elected politi-
cal representatives are ethical virtuosos. Rather, the term ethical democracy 
is rooted in the early democratic theorists of American pragmatism and 
marks off a particular way of living together and imagining ourselves as 
inhabiting a shared future in a free society.22 Such a way of living together 
requires democratic institutions to channel shared desires into public 
policy and laws, but it also requires an underlying democratic culture that 
shapes individuals capable of self- government, of advocating for equal eco-
nomic opportunity, of deliberating together and fostering political voice 
within all societal sectors. Ethical democracy thus demands attention to 
the cultural and institutional underpinnings of democratic life, not simply 
to partisan politics during elections; it involves habits of ongoing criticism 
of structures of economic or political domination and advocacy for move-
ments that foster democratic agency from below.
We suggest that the struggle to construct a shared future of ethical de-
mocracy must take seriously both the universalist and multiculturalist em-
phases within democratic theory. We ask how—in a deliberative democ-
racy in which elected representatives make ultimate political decisions, 
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Introduction / 9
yet are in principle accountable to all via a participatory society- wide dia-
logue—the workings of the democratic public sphere relate to the subal-
tern counter publics rooted in particular communities of interest. We ar-
gue that the ﬁ eld of faith- based organizing offers important lessons for an 
American public struggling to combine universalist democratic ideals with 
an increasingly multicultural reality— in what will soon be a thoroughly 
multi cultural society, as new immigrant arrivals and demographic diffusion 
spread diversity into settings that were once bastions of white subculture.
Those hoping to build a shared future of ethical democracy must also 
struggle with questions of power. Dominant institutional and cultural pat-
terns, even those that ultimately frustrate the best aspirations of all, also 
beneﬁ t some societal sectors— and those sectors use their power to resist 
change. As we argue in the concluding chapter, such hegemonic patterns 
typically change through some combination of “top- down” initiatives (for 
example, new legislation, new interests of economic elites) and “bottom-
 up” transformation (for example, social movements, demographic changes, 
and cultural change). All intentional efforts to foster social reform, includ-
ing the struggle to build ethical democracy, must therefore generate forms 
of counterhegemonic power. Thus while our analysis focuses on the cre-
ative tensions between universalist and multiculturalist democratic com-
mitments, questions of power are never far from the surface— and we re-
turn explicitly to those questions in the conclusion.
One way the ﬁ eld negotiates the universalist- multiculturalist tension is 
by thinking about social policy in terms of what john powell (he does not 
capitalize his names) has called “targeted universalism” (see chapter 4).23 
Targeted universalism involves setting universal goals for equal opportuni-
ties and social outcomes; its means of attaining those goals address the 
particular needs and draw on the particular strengths of concrete commu-
nities with their speciﬁ c histories. Such organizing by no means shelters 
subaltern communities from the pressure of democratic norms and de-
mands of responsible citizenship in a diverse society; indeed, when done 
well it exposes communities to the full challenge of engagement in the 
complex demands of public life in a culturally and racially diverse, scien-
tiﬁ cally and technologically based, polarized society with rising levels of 
economic inequality.
Signiﬁ cant sectors of faith- based community organizing use targeted 
universalism to negotiate the tension between universalist and multicultur-
alist understandings of the democratic challenge. In studying their efforts, 
we can most clearly see that tension’s creative potential, rather than assum-
ing that it necessarily undermines democratic work.
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Universalist and Multiculturalist Democracy in Action: 
The Scale and Strategic Ambition of Today’s 
Faith- Based Community Organizing
Contemporary community organizing in the United States draws from a 
variety of ﬁ gures in the history of grassroots American democracy, includ-
ing Jane Addams, Saul Alinsky, Cesar Chavez, and Martin Luther King Jr., 
as well as from union organizing and the movements for civil rights of 
African Americans, women, and Hispanics.24 Out of that broad tradition, 
Ed Chambers and the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) pioneered early 
elements of a model of organizing based more explicitly in community 
institutions— primarily but not exclusively religious congregations— a 
model that has been adopted and reworked by a variety of organizations. 
Today, most faith- based community organizing efforts are afﬁ liated with 
one of several sponsoring networks. Nationally, these include the PICO 
National Network, the Industrial Areas Foundation, the Gamaliel Founda-
tion, and National People’s Action (the last does both institution- based 
and individual- based organizing). Important regional networks include 
Direct Action and Research Training Center (DART) in the Southeast and 
Midwest and the InterValley Project (IVP) in New England, as well as state- 
level collaborations (most prominently the Ohio Organizing Collabora-
tive) and several statewide efforts internal to each network or collaborative 
efforts between these groups and other forms of organizing. In addition, 
a smaller number of organizations doing faith- based organizing exist in-
dependent of the formal sponsoring networks. Although each of the orga-
nizations mentioned above has developed its own organizing approach, 
they remain sufﬁ ciently similar to treat them as one ﬁ eld. Their “tool kits” of 
organizing practices overlap considerably, and all are built with institutions 
as their foundation— that is, participants are not “members” of the organi-
zation, but rather become involved via congregations, labor unions, parent- 
teacher organizations, neighborhood organizations, or other institutions.25 
More broadly still, a variety of other community organizing efforts built on 
individual rather than institutional membership also form part of this tra-
dition. The Center for Community Change, the National Domestic Work-
ers Alliance, the Center for Third World Organizing, and ACORN (before 
its collapse, with its work still carried forward in some states) represent im-
portant strands of this model. Other related organizing models include the 
work of Interfaith Worker Justice, Clergy and Laity United for Economic Jus-
tice (CLUE), and the Sojourners community. But all these differ signiﬁ cantly 
from the faith- based model founded on institutions that is analyzed here.26
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Introduction / 11
The organizations studied here train grassroots leaders to push for pub-
lic policy to improve the quality of life for residents of poor, working- class, 
and middle- class communities. They sponsor “political actions” or “ac-
countability sessions” at which they call on political ofﬁ cials to support 
particular public policies; organizations based in religious congregations 
undergird that call by articulating a vision of a better community and a 
good society, drawing on the languages of faith traditions. Each member 
institution typically works on issues of concern in its local area and col-
laborates with the larger coalition to address issues requiring citywide solu-
tions. This model of organizing has often helped produce policy change 
regarding city services, policing, low- income housing, health care, immi-
gration enforcement, and public education; the ﬁ elds’ most sophisticated 
practitioners have organized and trained long- standing teams of leaders in 
communities that previously suffered from a lack of effective democratic 
representation.
Because each local coalition carries a unique name, and because un-
til recently nearly all such organizing focused on local issues, the broad 
reach of faith- based community organizing in the United States often goes 
unrecognized beyond the local level. But in fact these organizations have 
built a signiﬁ cant presence in American society and faith communities. As 
of 2011, 189 local community organizing coalitions rooted in institutions 
existed in the United States, with a presence in forty of the ﬁ fty states. In 
order to see clearly the contours of that presence, we draw on our National 
Study of Community Organizing Coalitions, a new national census of all 
institution- based organizing efforts in the United States.27 These coali-
tions, as reported in detail in subsequent chapters, are among the most 
racially, ethnically, and socioeconomically diverse civil society organiza-
tions in America. They also represent substantial religious diversity. Of the 
approximately 4,500 community institutions that provide the foundation 
for this work, more than 3,500 are religious congregations from a variety 
of traditions. The strong majority is from the liberal and moderate Prot-
estant (32%), historic African American (24%), and the Roman Catholic 
(27%) denominations. But Jewish synagogues (5%) and Unitarian Univer-
salist churches (4%) also have a growing presence, each having more than 
doubled their proportion of participating congregations in the last decade. 
Evangelical Christian (4%) and Pentecostal Christian (2%) churches also 
engage in this work, but at levels not nearly reﬂ ective of their presence in 
the wider ﬁ eld of American congregations— in which they represent nearly 
half of all congregations. This underrepresentation is particularly acute for 
white evangelical churches.
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12 / Introduction
The religious composition of the ﬁ eld should be understood in the 
overall context of the changing demographic and organizational structure 
of religion in the United States. While beyond our purposes here to fully 
delve into that structure, a quick summary may sufﬁ ce. First, the propor-
tion of Americans who report no religious afﬁ liation (religious “nones”) 
has rapidly increased over recent decades, in part because they have been 
alienated by faith- based voices of religious exclusivism. Religious nones 
now represent about a ﬁ fth of all Americans— and almost a third of 
Americans under the age of thirty.28 Combined with rising religious di-
versity, these trends may mean that faith- based community organizing 
will increasingly need secular allies and that the more tolerant and diverse 
faith voices associated with this ﬁ eld will have an easier hearing in the 
public arena. Second, the more liberal Protestant congregations and the 
core urban churches within the historic African American and Catholic 
traditions— all mainstays of the faith- based organizing ﬁ eld— have un-
dergone ﬁ scal and organizational decline in recent decades. Such decline 
may or may not continue, but it has clearly presented challenges to the 
ﬁ eld in ways we will later see. Third, white evangelicals and African Ameri-
can and Latino evangelicals of the Pentecostal tradition have all shown a 
growing propensity to address issues of inequality in society. Reﬂ ecting 
this trend, these groups have become more active in faith- based organiz-
ing, as have Jewish synagogues and Unitarian Universalist churches. Fi-
nally, sectors of American Catholicism that have long been committed to 
social justice and addressing inequality are showing new vigor under Pope 
Francis I. This new energy and the potential, under Francis’s inspiration, 
for renewed institutional priority to Catholic social teaching may but-
tress Catholic involvement in faith- based organizing and, more generally, 
strengthen the Catholic voice on issues of inequality in society. All these 
contextual factors will shape the trajectory of faith- based organizing in the 
future, and thus its ability and desire to link public policy to universal and 
multicultural democratic priorities.
The most consequential example of faith- based organizing’s effort to 
link universalist and multiculturalist democratic commitments— which 
also reﬂ ects the ﬁ eld’s strategic ambition to effectively address inequality 
and policy paralysis at the national and state levels— lies precisely in what 
is arguably the most important domestic policy initiative of recent decades: 
health care reform. At the forefront of this effort is the PICO National Net-
work.29 The PICO National Network sponsors a particular model of faith- 
based community organizing in nineteen states, through the work of ﬁ fty 
local organizing coalitions that the network refers to as “federations.”30 We 
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will see more of the PICO National Network later; here, we brieﬂ y proﬁ le 
its national work in order to demonstrate the ﬁ eld’s emergent strategic am-
bitions. PICO ﬁ rst achieved prominent national- level inﬂ uence during the 
debate under the administration of President George W. Bush regarding 
reauthorization of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 
the primary federal program to provide insurance coverage to uninsured 
children (approximately ﬁ fteen million American children lacked health 
insurance at the time of SCHIP’s enactment in 1997). In 2007 and 2008, 
PICO leaders testifying before Congress provided much of the faith- based 
moral voice in favor of reauthorization, and twice Congress passed the rel-
evant legislation— only to see it vetoed by President Bush as unwarranted 
federal spending. As one of its ﬁ rst acts under President Barack Obama in 
2009, Congress once again passed SCHIP legislation, again with testimony 
from PICO leaders. Those leaders were in the front row of invited guests 
at the March 2009 White House ceremony at which Obama signed SCHIP 
reauthorization, accompanied by Vice President Joseph Biden, other lead-
ers in the administration, and the congressional leaders who had seen the 
legislation through.31
The PICO National Network continued its heavy involvement in the na-
tional health care reform effort during the 2009– 10 debate to shape the 
signature domestic initiative of the Obama administration’s ﬁ rst term: the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA, a.k.a. Obamacare). Through the ACA, the ad-
ministration sought to universalize access to insured health care and bring 
down the long- term cost of health care provision in American society. 
Throughout this period, the ﬁ nal shape of the legislation was very much 
in doubt— as was its ultimate passage until the very end, as congressional 
Republicans emboldened by the “Tea Party” movement united to defeat it. 
PICO was a prominent part of the coalition seeking to shape the legisla-
tion in ways maximizing affordability and access: affordability for low- and 
middle- income families and individuals, and access to health care in poor 
communities. PICO leaders testiﬁ ed in Congress, met with administration 
policy makers, and rallied on Capitol Hill and in the home districts of key 
legislators around the country. Most of that effort went into pushing for 
substantial subsidies to help low- income workers afford health insurance 
in the new health care exchanges and coverage for immigrant workers; 
both items were eventually adopted in the ﬁ nal legislation.
Through this effort, faith- based community organizing demonstrated 
its capacity to work effectively for signiﬁ cant policy change, not only 
at neighborhood and metropolitan levels but also in state and national 
policy arenas.32 Particularly important for the success of such higher- level 
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organizing efforts are three factors: (1) the ability to mobilize “everyday 
folks” (in both home congressional districts and periodic national events) 
who are perceived as not the typical Beltway activists, and thus granted a 
certain credibility in policy circles; (2) the ability to do so over sustained 
periods (measured in years) in order to shape gradual policy emergence, 
build a political reputation, and forge lasting coalitions with other orga-
nizations in favor of pragmatic policies to beneﬁ t poor and middle- class 
Americans; and (3) perhaps the unique strength of faith- based organizing 
as a sector— the ability of religious leaders to ﬂ uently connect such prag-
matic policy alternatives to the deep moral languages and ethical framing 
carried by their various faith traditions.33
While the health care debate represents the highest proﬁ le the ﬁ eld has 
attained on successful national legislation so far, faith- based organizing 
has come to play a salient role in the public arena at the local, state, and 
national levels in a wide range of settings around the country. As we shall 
see, the ﬁ eld built that inﬂ uence on a foundation of universal democratic 
values, the mobilization of highly diverse constituencies, and an embrace 
of the multicultural reality of those constituencies. Furthermore, some sec-
tors of faith- based organizing have made working for racial equity— both 
within their organization and in the public sphere— an explicit commit-
ment. The ﬁ eld thus constitutes an ideal case study for understanding the 
tensions between the universal norms of democratic theory and the speciﬁ c 
democratic demands our emergent multicultural reality generates. Such 
tensions represent a dilemma within contemporary democracy. But we ar-
gue that it is a dilemma fertile with constructive possibilities for building a 
shared future for all Americans, a future that narrows our yawning chasms 
of inequality and ends the strategic policy paralysis in the nation’s capital. 
In so doing, such work might enable democracy to once again serve as a 
beacon to people the world over.
The Other Democratic Dilemma: 
Religion in the Public Sphere
Using faith- based organizing as a case study of universalist- multiculturalist 
tensions also introduces a second key theme that remains in the back-
ground for much of our analysis yet should not disappear from our sight: 
the complex role of religion in contemporary democratic debate and in 
helping the ﬁ eld of faith- based organizing manage its internal diversity.
Culturally defensive religious forms— and at times explicitly anti- 
intellectual and fundamentalist expressions of them— have come to domi-
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nate religiously framed public discourse, at least in the popular perception 
based on media coverage. That perception of blanket religious conserva-
tivism across issues from access to birth control to sexual behavior to gay 
marriage to tax policy to American and Israeli policy in Palestine repre-
sents a gross oversimpliﬁ cation of complex religious terrain, and the con-
servativism itself often oversimpliﬁ es complex religious teachings. But the 
perception is pervasive and has combined with public scandals regarding 
clergy sexual misconduct and irresponsible religious authority to under-
mine the credibility of religious voices within American political discourse. 
Although no doubt celebrated among strong secular fundamentalists, this 
weakening of public religion represents a signiﬁ cant democratic loss. His-
torically, religious actors played central roles in democratic movements, 
from the nineteenth- century abolition of slavery to Progressive- era urban 
reform to the movements for the civil rights of minorities to the struggles 
to end apartheid in South Africa and gross human rights violations in Cen-
tral America. It remains an open question whether faith- based community 
organizing can contribute to reestablishing a credible religious voice for 
deepening democracy that is broadly accepted as legitimate in the Ameri-
can public arena.
Benhabib’s argument for a political and moral universalism that ex-
poses all human communities and cultural traditions to democratizing 
critique— and explicitly against those models of multiculturalism that 
would particularize cultural groups and shield them from the claims, op-
portunities, and challenges of shared democratic life— carries an important 
implication for this book’s analysis of religion and public life. Whereas 
academic multiculturalists typically either exclude religious voices from se-
rious consideration as democratic protagonists or see religion as simply 
another set of incommensurable cultural strands that can be tolerated by 
society, Benhabib’s version of political and moral universalism must in-
clude religious traditions as potential democratic interlocutors. But how 
can they best play this role?
A given tradition or community (religious or otherwise) can certainly 
argue that some emergent democratic norm should not apply to them, on 
the grounds of the integrity and self- understanding of the tradition. But all 
such communities face rising democratic expectations, both among their 
own dissenting members and in wider American society; all face evolving 
societal standards of what constitutes the minimal acceptable norms of 
democratic life. So traditional arguments may or may not carry the day. 
Gradually, even the most traditional of religions change, driven by on going 
internal discernment and shifting societal priorities and standards. This 
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need not be seen as giving up the founding religious truths of the tradition, 
but rather can be seen as the ongoing discernment of the implications of 
religious truth in light of new realities and keener insight— or even of on-
going divine revelation.34
Wood has written elsewhere more extensively about the role of religion 
in public life, not the focus here.35 But given that faith- based community 
organizing is primarily comprised of religious congregations representing 
multiple traditions, it is worth noting that religion represents a key mecha-
nism through which these groups live out their commitment to universal-
ism within a multiculturally rooted social movement. For some readers, 
this will represent a sticking point. For those whose only real exposure to 
religion has been via the voices of fundamentalism emanating from stri-
dent factions of evangelical Christian, Catholic, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, or 
Orthodox traditions in different countries, the very deﬁ nition of a demo-
cratic public sphere seems to exclude religion from any democratic public 
role. Fundamentalist deﬁ nitions of truth claim to lie beyond critical reason 
and thus are not open to deliberative debate. But this represents simply a 
caricature of religion’s historical public voice and fails to capture the real-
ity of much more sophisticated and nuanced voices of religion today. Over 
time, Habermas recognized the ways that religious traditions can open 
themselves to critical reason and thus become valuable actors within the 
democratic public sphere.36
The reﬂ exivity of religious traditions is the crucial issue, as shown in 
the works of Michele Dillon and Jerome Baggett. Dillon embraces Haber-
mas’s democratic criterion noted above but argues that certain forms of 
religion— even those most deeply rooted in “tradition”— can embrace and 
practice a kind of ongoing self- revision that meets the demand for open-
ness of all truth claims to critical evaluation and ongoing revision.37 Us-
ing the Catholic Church as a case study of a religious tradition asserting a 
strong claim to fundamental truth, she analyzes how any given speciﬁ c reli-
giously deﬁ ned truth is critically appropriated, interpreted, and potentially 
revised within the context of commitment to the overall tradition. Although 
Dillon certainly does not suggest that contemporary Catholicism is a para-
gon of such reﬂ exivity, she argues that openness to such reﬂ exivity is crucial 
for religious traditions to remain credible and legitimate interlocutors in 
a democratic public arena. More recently, Jerome Baggett shows how this 
kind of reﬂ exivity undergirds the continuing engagement and vitality of 
American Catholics from across the political and theological spectra.38 In 
this way, religious actors can participate in the democratic public sphere, 
both as active interlocutors in societal deliberation and by exposing their 
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tradition’s teachings and practices to ongoing dialogue and potential cri-
tique. Religious traditions thus become credible public actors to the extent 
they embrace the fundamental norms of democratic participation, such 
as willingness to listen to competing societal voices (including scientiﬁ c 
claims, alternative political positions, and other religious voices).39
While this theme of religion in the public arena is not a central focus 
of this book, it does return in two important ways in the end. First, we 
show that religiously grounded cultural practices are crucial to how these 
organizations manage internal racial and ethnic diversity (as well as socio-
economic diversity). Second, we argue that religiously grounded capacities 
for reﬂ exivity and deliberation represent key practices through which faith- 
based community organizing links its universalist and multiculturalist 
democratic commitments.
Thus the role of religion in public life reemerges in the conclusion for 
both analytical and ethical reasons: analytically, because the faith- based or-
ganizing ﬁ eld operates precisely at the intersection of religion and politics, 
and ultimately its democratic capacity draws important sustenance from its 
spiritual grounding; ethically, because faith- based organizing represents a 
concrete effort to deepen democracy in American life, which we consider a 
central ethical goal of our time.
It seems hard to disagree with the notion of “deepening democracy.”40 
But in invoking this as an overarching need for our time, we mean some-
thing speciﬁ c and more controversial. Deepening democracy involves 
reversing the rising economic inequality in American life while simulta-
neously improving the ability of everyday citizens to have an impact in 
shaping societal priorities. That is, deepening democracy involves increas-
ing “equality” and “voice” in American society, in ways that build toward 
a shared future closer to the ideal we term ethical democracy.41 Since some 
religious congregations are profoundly engaged in this work, we pay at-
tention to religion’s role in it while focusing primarily on the interplay of 
universalizing and multiculturalist strands within the democratic public 
sphere.
Outline of the Book’s Argument
This book’s central theme revolves around three key arguments. First, that 
a commitment to a certain kind of moral and political universalism can 
simultaneously sustain strong engagement with multiculturalism (in this 
case via practices of reﬂ exivity and deliberation within a democratic public 
sphere internal to a movement). Second, that some sectors of the faith- 
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based organizing ﬁ eld combine such reﬂ ective multiculturalism- within- 
universalism with the organizational infrastructure and strategic capacity 
needed to make a signiﬁ cant impact on economic inequality, policy paraly-
sis, and racial injustice in American life. Third, that the ﬁ eld as a whole still 
falls short of living up to that promise. To defend those claims, we show: 
(a) that the ﬁ eld of faith- based community organizing has sufﬁ cient insti-
tutional scale to actually make a difference in civil and political society; 
(b) that at least a signiﬁ cant portion of the ﬁ eld succeeds reasonably well 
at linking universal democratic values and multicultural commitments; 
and (c) that the ﬁ eld effectively brings those values and commitments to 
bear on public policy, but could do so more widely than is the case today. 
If faith- based community organizing does so, we argue that it can indeed 
help shape a shared future through which American society moves closer 
to an ethical democracy less bedeviled by economic inequality, policy pa-
ralysis, and racial injustice.
The chapters of part I address the ﬁ rst issue. We draw on systematic new 
evidence to argue that faith- based community organizing today has the or-
ganizational infrastructure, diverse leadership, and signiﬁ cant elements of 
the strategic capacity and organizational culture to play this role. Chapter 1 
lays the groundwork for the subsequent analysis by presenting the overall 
national proﬁ le of the ﬁ eld, especially its signiﬁ cant growth in scale and 
capacity over the last decade. The next two chapters present the results of 
the National Study of Community Organizing Coalitions, a census of es-
sentially all faith- based community organizing efforts in the United States. 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed demographic proﬁ le of the local leadership 
within faith- based community organizing and highlights the emergence of 
a more diverse ﬁ eld of leaders (in part via the internal struggle to recruit, 
retain, and promote a diverse leadership base). Chapter 3 describes the 
ﬁ eld’s organizational infrastructure and strategic capacity, suggesting that 
although the former is impressive, the latter is uneven and at times disap-
pointing. The chapter closes with a brief comparative analysis of how the 
ﬁ eld handles a quite different dimension of diversity: the challenges associ-
ated with having diverse sponsoring religious traditions. In keeping with 
the quantitative data being analyzed, our writing in part I strives for a rela-
tively objective tone, laying out the contours of the ﬁ eld and the organi-
zational underpinnings of its work to address economic inequality, policy 
paralysis, and racial injustice.
Part II offers an extended case study of one particular network’s shift 
to a focus on racial equity within its own structures and on racial justice 
in America. Because part II draws on ethnographic and interview data, the 
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tone shifts to a more interpretive mode of analysis as we strive to under-
stand the dynamics of organizational culture that accompany such a trans-
formation. Chapter 4 discusses how the universalist moral and political 
orientation that underlies the political culture of faith- based community 
organizing plays out in the context of that shift, particularly vis- à- vis Afri-
can American communities but with an eye toward how those communi-
ties intersect with predominantly white, Latino, and Asian/Paciﬁ c institu-
tions. Chapter 5 analyzes the highest- proﬁ le national campaign for racial 
equity and racial justice within faith- based community organizing today. 
Chapter 6 offers a less “digested” view into these dynamics via a 2013 in-
terview with a key national leader of that campaign. Chapter 7 steps back 
to suggest what these efforts to deepen democracy can tell us about the 
role of spirituality and creativity in democratic struggles, and how those 
struggles might be better grounded in American culture and institutions. 
Drawing on the concept of “ethical democracy” that Wood’s previous work 
used to characterize the ethos that underlies faith- based community orga-
nizing, we argue throughout that efforts to sustain moral/political univer-
salism and multiculturalism can learn a great deal from faith- based orga-
nizing’s commitment to ethical democracy— but it will only do so if the 
ﬁ eld succeeds in embodying that ideal and projecting it more assertively 
into American political society. The conclusion reﬂ ects on the way forward 
into a more satisfying and democratic future shared by all.
Co
py
rig
ht
 ©
 ${
Da
te}
. $
{P
ub
lis
he
r}.
 A
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
.
